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iExecutive Summary
Because of demographic changes and increased life expectancy, the need for long-term
care services by older Ohioans is substantial and growing rapidly. Today, persons aged 65 and
over represent 13 percent of the population in the state; by 2030, when the baby boomers will
have reached age 65, they will represent 21 percent of the population. In addition, persons aged
85 and over, who are at the greatest risk of needing long-term care services, are one of the fastest
growing age groups in the state.
Given this anticipated increase in demand for services and the limitations of existing
publicly funded long-term care coverage, the financing and delivery of long-term care for older
Ohioans has been and will remain an important policy issue. There has been interest in private
sector approaches to financing long-term care because of concern over the cost of expanding
publicly financed long-term care benefits. Consequently, considerable attention has focused on
private insurance for long-term care. Furthermore, private insurance for long-term care provides
one of the few available mechanisms for older Ohioans to protect themselves against the
catastrophic costs of long-term care.
This report provides a snapshot of the current long-term care insurance market in the state
of Ohio and nationally; discusses the evolution of the market, provides an in-depth look at
current products and choices in the state of Ohio, discusses the business of long-term care
insurance, examines long-term care insurance regulations, outlines consumers’ ability to make
informed decisions; and assesses the adequacy of protection for purchasers against the costs of
long-term care and the ability of products to meet consumer needs. Finally, it concludes by
offering policy recommendations for the further development of long-term care insurance in
Ohio.
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Introduction &
Background
Because of demographic changes
and increased life expectancy, the need for
long-term care services by older Ohioans is
substantial and growing rapidly
(Mehdizadeh, Kunkel, & Ritchey, 2001).
Today, persons aged 65 and over represent
13 percent of the population in the state
(U.S. Census Bureau, 2001); by 2030, when
the baby boomers will have reached age 65,
they will represent 21 percent of the
population (U.S. Census Bureau, 2001). In
addition, persons aged 85 and over, who are
at the greatest risk of needing long-term care
services, are one of the fastest growing age
groups in the state (Mehdizadeh, Kunkel, &
Applebaum, 1996).
Given this anticipated increase in
demand for services and the limitations of
existing publicly funded long-term care
coverage, the financing and delivery of
long-term care for older Ohioans has been
and will remain an important policy issue
(Applebaum, Mehdizadeh, & Straker, 2000).
There has been interest in private sector
approaches to financing long-term care
because of concern over the cost of
expanding publicly financed long-term care
benefits (Landes, 1987; Mulvey & Stucki,
1998; Alecxih & Lutzky, 1995).
Consequently, considerable attention has
focused on private insurance for long-term
care (Wiener, Tilly, & Goldenson., 2000;
Cohen & Kumar, 1997).
Private insurance for long-term care
provides one of the few available
mechanisms for older Ohioans to protect
themselves against the catastrophic costs of
long-term care. The National Association of
Insurance Commissioners (National
Association of Insurance Commissioners
[NAIC], 1998) defines long-term care
insurance as:
any insurance policy or rider which
provides coverage for not less than
twelve consecutive months on an
expense incurred, indemnity, prepaid or
other basis for one or more necessary or
medically necessary diagnostic,
preventive, therapeutic, rehabilitative,
maintenance or personal care services,
provided in a setting other than an acute
care unit of a hospital (p. 1).
Thus, in contrast to health insurance, long-
term care insurance is distinguished by two
major characteristics: (1) it provides
coverage for extended care services (at least
12 months); and (2) it covers services not
provided in acute care settings (i.e.,
hospitals) (NAIC, 1998).
Like other types of health insurance,
long-term care insurance varies greatly in
cost, covered benefits, and benefit criteria
(U.S. Congress Senate Special Committee
on Aging, 2000). Most long-term care
insurance policies sold in Ohio are
indemnity products, which cover both
nursing home stays and home care visits at a
fixed rate per day or per home care visit
(Ohio Department of Insurance [ODI],
1999). Typically, the policies will pay for
between two and an unlimited number of
years in a nursing home, with a deductible
period (e.g., no coverage for the first 20 to
100 days).
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The state of Ohio has an interest in
long-term care insurance to help
potentially reduce the state’s
expenditures for long-term care and
to ensure that consumers receive
adequate protection from products
they purchase.
Although long-term care insurance
currently pays for only a small portion of the
total cost of long-term care, it is expected to
become more important in the future
(Weiner, 1996). The state of Ohio has an
interest in long-term care insurance to help
potentially reduce the state’s expenditures
for long-term care and to ensure that
consumers receive adequate protection from
products they purchase (ODI, 2001). As an
illustration, the Ohio Department of
Insurance stated that, “The Department's
mission is consumer protection through
financial solvency regulation, market
conduct regulation and consumer education”
(ODI, 2001).
This report is designed to provide a
snapshot of the current long-term care
insurance market in the state of Ohio and
nationally; discuss the evolution of the
market; provide an in-depth look at current
products and choices in the state of Ohio;
examine long-term care insurance
regulations; outline consumers’ ability to
make informed decisions; and assess the
adequacy of protection for purchasers of
long-term care products to meet consumer
needs. Finally, it concludes by offering
policy recommendations for the devel-
opment of long-term care insurance in Ohio.
Long-term care insurance incor-
porates aspects of health, disability, and life
insurance into a unique, relatively new form
of insurance (Wiener, Hixon-Illston, &
Hanley, 1994). Like health insurance, it
offers coverage for health-related needs,
typically on a fee-for-service basis. Like
disability insurance, policies cover a wide
array of services that are necessitated by a
long-term disabling functional or cognitive
impairment (Alecxih, Kennell, Fox, & Rice,
1995); in addition, some policies provide
monthly cash payments (Wiener, Hixon-
Illston, & Hanley, 1994b). Long-term care
insurance, like life insurance, depends on
prefunding a benefit typically needed many
years in the future. The hybrid nature of the
product has implications for regulation,
purchasing decisions by consumers, the
likelihood that consumers will have
coverage for the services they desire, and
pricing of the product (Lencsis, 1997;
Weiner & Harris, 1991).
Insurers began offering long-term
care insurance widely in the mid-1980s. By
1998, 5.8 million policies had been sold
(LifePlans, 2000). Current policyholders are
dominated by purchasers of individual
policies. However, recent growth in new
sales has increasingly come from employer-
sponsored products (Pincus, 2000b). A
federal long-term care insurance offering
available in 2002 to federal employees is
expected to double the number of employer-
sponsored policyholders by the middle of
the decade (Pincus, 2000a).
Current long-term care insurance
policies typically include nursing home,
assisted living, and home and community-
based care coverage (LifePlans, 2001; ODI,
1999). The purchaser generally can select a
daily amount of coverage up to which the
policy will pay benefits if the policyholder
receives services from a certified provider
and meets the insurer’s disability eligibility
criteria (Lutzky & Alecxih, 1999; Crown,
Capitman, & Leutz, 1992). Purchasers also
have the option of automatically increasing
 Long-Term Care Insurance in Ohio
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the level of coverage over time or buying
increased coverage at specified intervals
(inflation protection)(LifePlans, 2001). In
some cases, purchasers also have the option
to purchase nonforfeiture benefits that return
some of the insured’s investment in his or
her policy if he or she stops paying
premiums (lapses) (Lencsis, 1997). Typical
features purchased have changed over time
with many more recent purchasers opting for
more complete coverage (see Table 1).
Table 1
Characteristics of Individual Long-Term Care Insurance Policies
Purchased in 1990, 1994 and 2000
Policy Characteristic 1990 1994 2000
Policy Type
Nursing home only
Nursing home and home care
Home care only
63%
37%
----
33%
61%
6%
14%
77%
9%
Daily Benefit Amount for Nursing Home Care $72 $85 $109
Daily Benefit Amount for Home Care $36 $76 $106
Nursing Home Benefit Duration 5.6 years 5.1 years 5.6 years
Individuals Choosing Inflation Protection 40% 33% 40%
Annual Premium $1,071 $1,505 $1,677
Note. From  Who buys long-term care insurance in 2000? A Decade of Study of Buyers and Nonbuyers by
Lifeplans, 2001, Health Insurance Association of America: Washington, DC.
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Over the past five years, most
insurance companies have switched to
offering a single pool of money rather than
separate pools that can only be used for
certain services (i.e. nursing home or home
and community-based care)(LifePlans,
2000). This single pool maximizes the
flexibility of service-based benefits because
an insured individual can apply the money
to services and facilities she or he needs and
desires, as long as it is for a covered service.
The benefit duration under this model is
dependent on how long it takes the insured
to spend his or her pool of money rather
than a certain specified time period. For
example, a policy with separate pools of
money with four years of coverage for
nursing home care at $100/day and home
care at $50/day would allow the insured to
receive up to $100 a day in a nursing facility
or $50 a day of home care for only four
years. On the other hand, the same policy
with a single pool of money policy would
offer $219,000 that could be used for either
type of care. Thus, the policy could be
stretched out to cover 12 years of home care
coverage if an average of $50 a day were
spent or it could cover six years of nursing
home care if the facility cost $100 a day.
THE BUSINESS OF LONG-TERM
CARE INSURANCE
Three key issues that could
determine the success of long-term
care insurance include how
adequately companies: 1) screen
poor risks (underwriting), 2) set
premiums, and 3) manage claims.
Three key issues that could
determine the success of long-term care
insurance include how adequately
companies: 1) screen poor risks
(underwriting), 2) set premiums, and 3)
manage claims (Wiener, Hixon-Illston, &
Hanley, 1994a). Underwriting is the process
through which insurance companies
determine whether someone who applies for
a policy should be issued a policy.
Companies underwrite policies to avoid
adverse selection by using written health
questions, interviews, medical record
reviews, and assessments (Lutzkey &
Alecxih, 1999; Wiener, Hixon-Illston, &
Hanley, 1994b). The depth of the assessment
conducted on an applicant generally
increases with age. Insurers generally have a
more difficult time screening for mild to
moderate cognitive impairment than
physical impairment and severe cognitive
impairment (Kolb, Veysey, & Gocke, 1991).
The premiums that insurers charge
influence whether consumers will purchase
the policies and whether the product is
profitable for the company (Doerpinghaus &
Gustavason, 1999; Kumar, Cohen, Bishop,
& Wallack, 1995; Cohen, Kumar, &
Wallack, 1993). Premium levels vary
significantly depending upon the level of
benefits, age of purchaser, and risk factors
such as smoking (as well as claims
expectations, interest rates, and profit
margins)(LifePlans, 2001). Most long-term
care insurance policies are sold with level
premiums (i.e., premiums are set to remain
the same over time as long as the
assumptions used to develop the premiums
are borne out)(Kumar, et al.). Premiums
range widely depending on coverage
amount, age, and typical services. For
example, a two-year policy with no inflation
protection that covers nursing home, assisted
living and home care and is issued at age 55
costs about $300 per year, compared to a
policy with similar benefits that includes
inflation protection and is issued at age 75
costing over $3100 annually (see Table
2)(ODI, 1999).
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Table 2
Policy Premiums for the Six Leading Long-Term Care Insurance Sellers in Ohio, 1999
Company
Number of
LTC
Customers in
Ohio
Age
55
Age 55
w/inflation
protection
Age
65
Age 65
w/inflation
protection
Age
75
Age 75
w/inflation
protection
Bankers Life
and Casualty
8,270 $326 $693 $693 $1276 $1808 $2687
Continental
Casualty
11,631 $336 $627 $694 $1187 $1747 $2610
GE Financial
Assurance
7,725 $378 $720 $765 $1323 $2124 $3105
IDS Life 9,168 $440 $860 $840 $1440 $1960 $3120
John Hancock
Mutual Life
7,947 $416 $844 $781 $1348 $2016 $3037
Penn Treaty
Network
America
5,048 $313 $520 $776 $1304 $2139 $3102
Note. From Ohio Shopper’s Guide: Long-Term Care Insurance by Ohio Dept. of Insurance, 1999. ODI: Columbus,
OH.
REGULATION
Traditionally, states have had the
primary responsibility for regulating the
insurance industry. The McCarran-Ferguson
Act of 1945 (P.L. 79-15) granted states the
power to regulate the business of insurance,
removing all Commerce Clause limitations
on the states’ authority in this area.
The National Association of
Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) deve-
oped uniform legislation for states (Hanson,
Dineen, & Johnson, 1974). At this point,
regulation of long-term care insurance
industry is a state function. Although
specific laws, resources, and regulatory
philosophies vary among the states, state
insurance regulatory agencies generally
perform the same functions (NAIC, 2000).
These include (1) implementing
requirements for regulating insurance
premium rates and the content of insurance
policies, (2) licensing insurance companies
and agents to conduct business in the state,
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(3) enforcing consumer protection standards
and unfair trade practice laws, and (4)
examining the financial condition of
insurance companies (ODI, 2001).
States’ insurance regulatory agencies
are linked through the NAIC, which
includes the heads of regulatory agencies in
each state, the District of Columbia, and the
U.S. territories (NAIC, 2001a). It provides a
forum for state insurance officials to discuss
common problems, standardize the annual
reporting of financial information by
insurance companies, and develop model
legislative acts for adoption by the states
(NAIC, 2000).
In 1985, the NAIC established an
advisory committee on long-term care. The
next year, the committee developed a
legislative proposal in the form of a model
act. A year after that, NAIC adopted model
regulations for implementing the model act
(Wiener, et al., 2000). The NAIC amended
its models in 1987 and 1988 to improve
policyholders’ coverage and strengthen
consumer protection. NAIC’s model law and
regulation suggest that states should adopt
minimum standards with regard to long-term
care insurance policies (NAIC, 2000).
In addition, although not a
regulation, the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996
defined qualified plans for the purpose of
tax deductibility, including an eligibility
trigger floor to control the tax revenue loss
associated with this provision and refers to
1993 NAIC model regulations related to
consumer protection. Consequently,
although HIPAA’s benefit triggers are more
restrictive than those that the NAIC
recommends for long-term care insurance
policies, almost all insurers have modified
their benefit eligibility requirements to
reflect HIPAA requirements. Although
HIPAA brought tax deductibility for long-
term care insurance, insurance companies
argue that it has burdened them with
inflexible criteria that cannot adapt easily to
the continuing innovation of the product.
OHIO DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE
(ODI)
In Ohio, the Department of Insurance
is the agency responsible for regulating
long-term care insurance (ODI, 2001). ODI
was created by section 121.02 of the Ohio
Revised Code (ORC) and has functioned as
the regulator of the insurance industry since
1872. ODI is responsible for protecting the
interests of the public by making sure
insurance companies adhere to the standards
established by Ohio law in a fair and
consistent manner.
ODI has identified several regulatory
goals which guide the Department’s
decision making process and enable it to
effectively administer and enforce Ohio’s
Insurance Laws related to long-term care
insurance. These goals include:
 Assuring that high quality, under-
standable long-term care insurance
products are available at fair and
reasonable prices.
 Assuring that long-term care
insurance companies are financially
sound and capable of meeting their
contractual obligations.
 Assuring that insurance agents are
competent and knowledgeable in the
long-term care insurance business
and conduct their activities according
to acceptable standards of business
conduct.
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 Assisting in developing increased
public understanding of long-term
care insurance and thereby helping
consumers make sound insurance
purchasing decisions.
The Consumer Services program
within ODI provides direct services to
consumers by responding to general
inquiries, investigating insurance complaints
against companies and agents, providing
health insurance counseling, developing and
distributing insurance publications, and
conducting educational outreach. In 1999,
the program responded to over 96,000
telephone requests for information or
assistance. In addition, the Ohio Senior
Health Insurance Information Program
(OSHIIP) has assisted over 340,000
Medicare beneficiaries, saving consumers
approximately 2.5 million dollars.
OSHIIP is a consumer education
program designed to encourage wise buying
and addresses consumer misconceptions
about long-term care and its costs. Working
through trained volunteers, the OSHIIP
program conducts public meetings and
media campaigns to educate consumers
about a range of insurance-related topics,
including long-term care insurance. Topics
covered include Medicare and Medicaid
eligibility and program benefits, as well as
comparison of available long-term care
insurance policies in the state. OSHIIP also
publishes a number of guides for consumers
including: Ohio Shoppers’ Guide to Long-
Term Care Insurance; Shoppers’ Guide to
Medicare Supplemental Insurance;
Shoppers’ Guide to Managed Care; and a
Shoppers’ Guide to Health Insurance.
The Ohio Shopper’s Guide to Long-
Term Care Insurance contains material on
Medicare and Medicaid benefits, materials
to aid prospective purchasers in evaluating
the adequacy of benefits, and a proposed
disclosure statement to be given to
purchasers explaining policies in uniform
language. Finally, it has a list of “Questions
to Ask [about long-term care insurance]”
and a glossary of long-term care terms. The
NAIC also publishes a consumer’s guide to
long-term care insurance entitled:
“Shopper’s Guide to Long-Term Care
Insurance” (NAIC, 2001b).
STATE INVOLVEMENT WITH LONG-
TERM CARE INSURANCE
State actions have included two
major approaches: requiring
insurers to offer long-term care
insurance, and encouraging market
development through tax incentives
and consumer education.
A number of states have encouraged
the purchase of long-term care insurance
(Somers & Merrill, 1991). State actions have
included two major approaches: requiring
insurers to offer long-term care insurance,
and encouraging market development
through tax incentives and consumer
education (see Appendix for an alternative
approach). Tax incentives to encourage
particular actions are a common strategy in
many situations. For example, in 1999 the
state of Ohio enacted an income tax
deduction for long-term care insurance
premium payments (see Table 3).
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Table 3
State Tax Incentives for Long-Term Care Insurance
State
Tax
Incentive
Total or
Partial
Premium
Deduction
Tax Credit Limit if
Partial
Effective
Date Statute
Ohio Individual
Deduction
Total 1999 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. Sec, 5747.01
(A)(11)(a)(1999)
Alabama Individual
Deduction
Total 1996 Ala. Code. Sec. 40-18-
15(a)(26)(1999)
Colorado Individual
Credit
Partial Lower of $150 or
25% of premium
2000 Colo. Rev. Stat. Sec. 39-22-
122(1999)
Indiana* Individual
Deduction
Total 2000 Ind. Code Sec. 6-3-1-
3.5(a)(16)(1999)
Iowa Individual
Deduction
Total 1997 Iowa Code Sec. 422.7(29)(Supp.
2000); Iowa Admin. Code Sec. 701-
40.48(422)(1999)
Kentucky Individual
Deduction
Total 1998 KY Rev. Stat. Ann. Sec.
141.010(10)(m)(1998)
Maine Individual
Deduction
Employer
Credit
Total
Partial Lowest of $5000,
20% of premium, or
$100 per insured
employee
1989
1996
ME. Rev. Stat. Ann. Tit. 36, Sec.
5122(2)(G) (1999);
ME. Rev. Stat. Ann. Tit. 36, Sec.
2525 (1999)
Maryland Employer
Credit
Partial 5% of employer
costs, less than
$5000, or $100 per
covered employee
1999 MD. Code Ann., Ins. Sec 6-117
(Supp. 1999); MD. Code Ann., Tax-
Gen. Sec 10-710 (Supp.1999)
Minnesota Individual
Credit
Partial Lower of $100 or
25% of premium
1999 Minn. Stat. Sec. 290.0672 (1999)
Missouri Individual
Deduction
Total 2000 MO. Rev. Stat. Sec. 135.096 (2000)
Montana Individual
Deduction
Total 1997 Mont. Code Ann. Sec. 15-30-
121(1)(g)(ii) (1997)
New York Individual
Deduction
Total Limited by age** 1996 N.Y. Tax Law Sec. 615 (C)(4)
North
Carolina
Individual
Credit
Partial $350 per policy 1999 N.C. Gen. Stat. Sec 105-151.28
(1998)
North
Dakota
Individual
Credit
Partial $100 1997 N.D. Cent. Code Sec. 57-38-29.2
(1993)
Utah Individual
Deduction
Total 2000 Utah Code Ann. Sec. 59-10-
114(2)(k) (1999)
Virginia Individual
Deduction
Total 2000 VA Code Ann. Sec. 58.1-322(D)(1)
Wisconsin Individual
Deduction
Total 1998 Wis. Stat. Sec. 71.06(6)(b)(26)
Note. From “Federal and State Initiatives to Jump Start the Market for Private Long-Term Care Insurance.” By J. Weiner, J.
Tilly, and S. Goldenson, 2000, Elder Law Journal, 8(1) p. 57-102.
*  Indiana’s tax deduction applies only to partnership policies.
** Age limitations in 1998 were: $210 for age 40 or younger; $400 for age 41 to 50; $800 for age 51 to 60; $2120 for age 61
to70; $2660 for age 71 and older.
Note: Tax incentive legislation is just one aspect of long-term care insurance legislation in the states. States also are enacting
disclosure bills, establishing requirements for coverage, and broaching the idea of long-term care coverage for state employees. A
number of states are setting up task forces to examine the viability of offering coverage, while other states that have set up long-
term care task forces have placed insurance on their agendas.
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Insurance industry advocates and
some other analysts contend that private
long-term care insurance could play an
important role in financing long-term care in
the coming decades (LifePlans, 2001). In
this view, the state of Ohio would benefit in
several ways if more middle-income people
could be induced to buy coverage (Cohen,
Kumar & Wallack, 1993). Future demand
for publicly financed services in Ohio,
particularly Medicaid, would be reduced,
and people would have superior access to a
continuum of long-term care services of
high quality and they would be less likely to
risk impoverishment (Crown, Capitman, &
Leutz, 1992; Wiener & Harris, 1991).
These claims seem plausible enough,
although there is disagreement about the
potential of long-term care insurance to
reduce Medicaid spending (Wiener, et al.,
2000). The key question is how Ohioans can
be persuaded to buy long-term care
insurance. Because premiums increase so
sharply with age, relatively few older
Ohioans can afford adequate coverage, and
even many of these may be screened out by
insurers’ underwriting practices. For this
reason, there is agreement that long-term
care insurance would have the greatest
impact if people would buy it during their
working years, when rates are lower and
underwriting rejections less likely. However,
people in their working years have other
spending priorities and have displayed little
interest in buying long-term care insurance
(LifePlans, 2001).
Growth in long-term care insurance
for younger workers may, then, continue to
depend on individual purchasing decisions
(Wiener, et al., 2000). Proponents of long-
term care insurance offer two basic
approaches to encourage greater
participation. First, they would make the
policies more affordable, chiefly by
providing tax incentives or other subsidies
for long-term care insurance purchasers
(Marlowe, 1996). Second, they would seek
to educate younger people about the benefits
of long-term care insurance (Lutzky &
Alecxih, 1999). Advocates of this plan point
out that many people may not recognize the
likelihood of potentially catastrophic
expenditures later in life or may not be
aware of the limitations in Medicare and
Medicaid benefits. If people understood the
risks, they say, the purchase of Long-Term
Care Insurance might become a routine part
of planning for retirement and old age.
These two strategies are necessarily
interrelated, but for the purposes of this
paper, they are considered separately.
TAX SUBSIDIES FOR LONG-TERM
CARE INSURANCE
The clarifications of the tax treat-
ment of long-term care insurance in the
Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) were
of benefit only to a few groups—those
whose employers are contributing to long-
term care insurance, rather than merely
offering it to everyone; the self-employed;
and those with medical expenses in excess
of 7.5 percent of adjusted gross income
(Wiener, et al., 2000).
There have been proposals at the
national level to provide broader tax
incentives for the purchase of long-term care
insurance. For example, the tax bill passed
by Congress in July 1999 would have
phased in an "above-the-line" deduction for
long-term care insurance premiums—that is,
the deduction would have been available to
taxpayers who did not itemize and would
eliminate the current requirement that
expenses exceed 7.5 percent of adjusted
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gross income. In addition, the bill extended
favorable tax treatment for long-term care
insurance purchased as part of employee
benefit plans. This would have permitted
workers to pay their premiums with tax-free
dollars and would presumably have
encouraged the growth of employer-
sponsored (but non-contributory) plans.
Both of these tax changes would
have a greater effect on taxpayers in higher
tax brackets. However, members of this
group may already be more disposed to buy
coverage or to accumulate assets sufficient
to meet their own long-term care needs. In
addition, it is difficult to justify a subsidy
targeted at the highest income taxpayers.
An alternative that spreads the
benefits more broadly is a tax credit, rather
than a deduction, for the purchase of long-
term care insurance. This reduces the
taxpayer’s actual tax bill, rather than taxable
income, providing the same benefit to
buyers at different income levels. Almost
half of all states, including Ohio, have now
enacted legislation to give tax deductions or
credits to consumers who buy long-term
care insurance for themselves, their spouse
or parents (Wiener, et al., 2000)(see Table
3)(see Appendix). Tax incentives are likely
to continue to expand. Each year, additional
states propose legislation to establish or
expand tax incentives for long-term care.
Efforts continue at the federal level to
expand the circumstances under which
consumers can gain tax advantages for the
private purchase of long-term care
insurance.
Another option would be to provide
an income-based subsidy for long term care
insurance premiums, either through the tax
system or through direct payment; this
would target assistance to lower-income
purchasers. For example, taxpayers with
adjusted gross income up to a specified
amount might receive a credit equal to 25
percent of their long-term care insurance
premiums; the credit would then be phased
out for those with higher incomes, becoming
unavailable when adjusted gross income
exceeded some maximum threshold.
Subsidy options entail federal
revenue losses that would eventually be
partially offset by Medicaid savings.
However, the revenue losses are immediate,
whereas the Medicaid savings would come
far in the future. A recent simulation of the
long-range effects of four different possible
tax subsidy schemes found that all resulted
in sizable net federal losses on initiation.
Furthermore, only one of the options
approached break-even after 25 years, in
2018 (Mulvey & Stucki, 1998).
Leaving aside the potential cost of
subsidies, it is not clear whether tax
incentives makes the purchase of long term
care insurance much more attractive than it
already is (Wiener, et al., 2000). In 1995, the
average federal taxpayer paid a marginal
rate of 14.7 percent. An above-the-line
deduction for the purchase of long-term care
insurance in that year would have reduced a
$500 annual premium for a 40-year-old to
$427. Allowing purchase through flexible
spending arrangements would also reduce
the taxpayer’s liability for Social Security
and Medicare payroll taxes—a $500 policy
would then cost $388. It is not clear whether
such price reductions would be sufficient to
induce many more middle-income persons
to buy coverage during their working years.
The American Council of Life
Insurance estimates that 58 percent of those
aged 45 to 49 could afford a five-year policy
without any subsidy, assuming that one can
afford the policy if the premium is less than
three percent of the buyer’s income (Mulvey
 Long-Term Care Insurance in Ohio
Scripps Gerontology Center Page 11
& Stucki, 1998). Obviously the results
would differ if some other criterion for
affordability were used—for example, five
percent of income, or ten. What matters is
how much each person is actually willing to
spend. Thus, the second component of the
private long term care insurance strategy—
education about the need for long term care
insurance—may be more important than any
subsidy scheme.
CONSUMER EDUCATION ABOUT
LONG-TERM CARE INSURANCE
Consumers can make informed
choices only if they have an
understanding of the nature of the
risk of needing long-term care and
the potential for protection from that
risk that is offered by insurance.
Consumers can make informed
choices only if they have an understanding
of the nature of the risk of needing long-
term care and the potential for protection
from that risk that is offered by insurance
(Lutzky & Alecxih, 1999). Consumers must
first decide whether purchasing a product is
appropriate given their personal
circumstances (ODI, 1999). Many consumer
groups and regulators argue that long-term
care insurance is not appropriate for certain
people and should not be sold to them,
particularly those who would quickly
qualify for Medicaid if they were to require
long-term care services (Wiener, et al.,
2000). However, industry representatives
contend that the population for whom long-
term care insurance is appropriate is unclear
and that although some general suitability
guidelines may help consumers make an
informed choice, anyone should be able to
purchase long-term care insurance if they
choose to do so (NAIC, 2001). Purchasers of
long-term care insurance are on average in
their late 60s, married, highly educated
relative to the general population, and have
substantial income and assets (LifePlans,
2001).
Once a decision on the suitability of
purchase has been made, consumers are
faced with difficult and confusing choices
related to product features (Lutzky &
Alecxih, 1999). The ability of consumers to
compare policies and make informed
choices is hampered by: 1) numerous policy
options and features; 2) the complexity of
the product; 3) the rapid changes occurring
in products; and 4) a lack of easy-to-obtain,
unbiased sources of information (ODI,
2001). Currently, insurance agents serve as
the primary mechanism for translating
arcane language and providing advice on
which policy to buy and options to choose
from (Lutzky & Alecxih, 1999). Consumer
groups question whether agents always have
the best interest of the purchaser in mind
because they earn commissions.
The regulation of long-term care
insurance often requires tradeoffs
between protecting consumers and
allowing them to make choices.
The regulation of long-term care
insurance often requires tradeoffs between
protecting consumers and allowing them to
make choices (Lutzky & Alecxih, 1999).
Consumer groups express concern that long-
term care insurance is too complicated for
the typical consumer to understand and
efforts should be directed at making policies
easier to compare, such as standardizing
definitions and eligibility triggers for
benefits. These groups also advocate that
certain provisions, such as inflation
protection, be included in all long-term care
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policies. Industry representatives contend
that the consumer should be permitted as
much freedom as possible in tailoring the
policy to his or her own circumstances.
ADEQUACY OF LONG-TERM CARE
INSURANCE PROTECTION
In order for a policy to offer
adequate protection against the cost of long-
term care four conditions must be met: (1)
the person must pay premiums and retain the
policy (not lapse); (2) the policy must offer
enough benefits to cover a reasonable
portion of the costs of long-term care when
the person needs it; (3) the person must
qualify for benefits under the insurer’s
criteria when she or he is in need of care;
and (4) the long-term care services the
person needs must be covered by the policy
(Alecxih & Lutzky, 1996).
While current long-term care
insurance policies in Ohio appear to
offer significantly better coverage
than their predecessors, there is still
reason to be concerned about the
adequacy of the protection long-term
care insurance offers.
While current long-term care
insurance policies in Ohio appear to offer
significantly better coverage than their
predecessors, there is still reason to be
concerned about the adequacy of the
protection long-term care insurance offers
(GAO/HRD, 1989; Lutzky & Alecxih,
1999). Many Ohioans will not have
protection against the costs of long-term
care because they will not have active
policies when they need benefits. The
limited data available suggests that 30 to 50
percent of all individual purchasers of long-
term care insurance lapse within five years
(Wiener, et. al., 1994). Unfortunately,
current data do not allow us to fully
understand why people lapse and whether
these lapses result mostly from mortality and
people upgrading their policies, or whether
they reflect people paying premiums for a
time and dropping their policies
(GAO/HRD, 1993; Alecxih & Lutzky,
1996;). There are a number of ways that
regulatory mechanisms may reduce lapse
rates, including consumer education, agent
training, limits on commissions, suitability
standards, and mandating nonforfeiture
benefits (Lutzky & Alecxih). However,
some of these mechanisms limit consumers’
ability to choose which features they want
and also can increase price (Meier, 1999).
To assure adequate protection from
the financial risk associated with long-term
care, a person must purchase a benefit that
provides enough coverage for a long enough
period of time to prevent erosion of assets.
This level of coverage needs to account for
increases in the cost of long-term care.
“Adequate coverage” differs depending
upon the individual’s aversion to risk and
willingness to self-insure. Whereas some
people look for complete protection against
all the costs of long-term care, others would
rather keep premiums low by only insuring
against catastrophic costs (e. g., an extended
stay in a nursing home) (Lencsis, 1997).
Among those who keep their policies
until they need benefits, some may
experience substantial out-of-pocket
payments because: 1) purchased benefit
amounts are lower than typical nursing
home costs; and 2) over one-seventh of
policyholders who go into a nursing home
could be in an institution longer than the
duration of their policy (Lutzky & Alecxih,
1999). Those who do not purchase inflation
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protection could have significantly greater
out-of-pocket expenses.
The benefit triggers a company uses
to assess whether an individual meets its
criteria will strongly influence whether or
when a person receives benefits (Meier,
1999). Companies using functional
impairment triggers base them almost
exclusively on impairment in activities of
daily living (ADLs) and cognitive
impairment and nearly all policies sold in
Ohio comply with the HIPAA criteria to be
a “qualified” plan (ODI, 1999). To be
qualified, long-term care insurance benefits
are only “triggered” when a person needs
substantial assistance in performing at least
two of six activities of daily living and the
assistance is expected to last at least ninety
days,  or   requires   substantial   supervision
resulting from a severe cognitive
impairment.
LONG-TERM CARE INSURANCE FOR
STATE EMPLOYEES
Over nineteen states-Alabama,
Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New York, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon,
South Carolina, Washington, and Wisconsin
offer long-term care insurance to their state
employees (Wiener, Tilly, & Goldenson,
2000)(see Table 4).
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Table 4
Long-Term Care Insurance for State Employees
OHIO CALIFORNIA COLORADO CONNECTICUT WASHINGTON
Date
Implemented 1999* 1995 1998 1997 1998
Eligibility Employees,
spouses, parents
and parents-in-
law, and adult
children of
employees
Employees,
retirees and
their spouses,
parents and
parents-in-law
Employees,
retirees and
their spouses,
parents and
parents-in-law
Employees, retirees
and their spouses,
parents and
parents-in-law,
grandparents and
grandparents-in-
law
Employees,
retirees and their
spouses, parents
and parents-in-
law
Underwriting Short form
underwriting at
initial offering
and for new
hires. All others
subject to
standard
underwriting.
Seven question
underwriting on
medical
conditions and
impairments;
those age 65 or
older who pass
this test then
undergo
medical record
review,
telephone
history, and
possible face-
to-face
interview.
Underwriting is
necessary to
keep premiums
down and
induce insurers
to participate.
Active
employees at
time of initial
offering and
new hires
receive two
question
underwriting;
their spouses
respond to six
questions;
retirees are
subject to full
underwriting.
Modified
guaranteed
issue likely
raised
premiums,
reducing sales.
 Employees
working 30 hours
per month subject
to no underwriting
if they purchase
insurance within
four months of
initial offering at
their agency.
Everyone else
subject to standard
underwriting.
Connecticut
wanted to set an
example for
employers and
forgo underwriting
for employees.
Insurers would not
have participated if
Connecticut’s
group were small.
Short form
underwriting at
initial offering
and for new hires.
All others subject
to standard
underwriting.
Underwriting is
necessary to keep
premiums down
and induce
insurers to
participate.
Precentage of
applicants
denied
purchase
155,000
applications
since 1995.
24,000 denied =
15.5% denial
rate. Of the
24,000, 21,000
were retirees.
One or two
active
employees have
been denied.
Retiree denial
rates are much
higher.
12% of applicants,
most of whom are
retirees.
2078 application
forms completed
correctly. 240
were denied
coverage= denial
rate of 11.5%. Of
those denied
coverage, four
were employees.
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OHIO CALIFORNIA COLORADO CONNECTICUT WASHINGTON
Selection of
insurers
Ohio issued a
brief request for
proposals and
selected one
insurer (Aetna
Life Insurance
Co.).
CalPERS is
self-funded
with a separate
trust fund.
California
decided to self-
fund because a
feasibility study
showed that
there was very
little value
added by
involving
insurance
companies and
that premiums
were projected
to be 20-30%
lower under a
self-funded
plan.
The “Public
Employees
Association,”
(PERA) is the
agency
responsible for
administering
Colorado’s state
employee long-
term care
employee long-
term care
insurance
program. PERA
conducted a
competitive
bidding process
and selected a
plan
administrator.
The plan
administrator
had another
competitive
bidding process
and selected
one insurer.
Connecticut issued
a brief request for
proposals and
selected one
insurer.
Selected one
vendor
Inflation
protection
and
nonforfeiture
Mandatory offer
of both except
for parents and
parents-in-law.
Only mandatory
offer of both. If
an insured twice
turns down
optional
purchase of
additional
benefits, they
will not be
offered the
increases
anymore; 45%
of those offered
benefit
increases took
them, 66% of
purchasers
chose
compounded
inflation
protection. Only
63 people have
purchased
nonforfeiture
protection.
Mandatory
offer of
inflation
protection.
Mandatory
nonforfeiture
Mandatory
inflation protection
for those under age
65 and contingent
nonforfeiture
benefit (if policy
lapses because of
premium
increases).
Mandatory offer
of both.
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OHIO CALIFORNIA COLORADO CONNECTICUT WASHINGTON
Plan
premiums
Less than
equivalent
individual
policies.
20-30% less
than equivalent
individual
policies.
PERA
premiums are
equivalent or
higher than
individual
policies because
of modified
underwriting.
Connecticut
premiums are
equivalent or
higher because of
guaranteed issue.
Unknown
Marketing The insurer does
the marketing
during open
enrollment and
participates in
benefit fairs.
CalPERS uses
direct mail,
payroll stuffers,
newsletter
articles, videos,
seminars, e-
mail messages.
Direct mail and
newsletter
articles generate
the most leads.
90 meetings
were held
around the state
during initial
open
enrollment.
There also was
direct mail and
information in
internal
publications.
There will be
subsequent,
periodic open
enrollments.
The enrollment
broker educated
state employees
agency by agency.
The partnership
program educates
state employees
about long-term
care insurance in
general.
The insurer does
the marketing
during open
enrollment and
participates in
benefit fairs.
Enrollment State of Ohio
Plan has over
62,000 active
spouses,
members, and
retirees are not
eligible.
3-4% of active
employees and
5-7% of retirees
have purchased
policies. There
are 2.2 million
active
employees and
retirees. Other
related parties
bring the
number of
potential buyers
to 5 million.
Sales figures
are high
because
CalPERS has a
good reputation,
prices are
competitive,
and marketing
is effective.
1277 people
have enrolled
half of whom
were retirees
and half active
employees.
Colorado has
158,000 current
employees and
51,000 retirees.
Sales have been
low because of
competition
with other
vendors. These
vendors have
lower premiums
because
PERA’s policy
is modified
guaranteed
issue and has a
rich benefit
package.
540 policies have
been sold. The
state has 50,000
employees and
20,000 retirees.
The state’s
premiums are
higher than those
of the general
market.
136,671
employees and
retirees; 1838
people enrolled,
of whom 1412 are
current
employees.
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OHIO CALIFORNIA COLORADO CONNECTICUT WASHINGTON
Lapse and
claim rates
Not available Policies lapse at
2.5% per year.
Policies lapse
due to death
and changes in
individual
circumstances.
115,000
policies remain
in force.
Since 1995,
claims have
cost $8 million.
CalPERS had
500 claimants
in February,
1999. Claims
activity is 40%
less than
actuaries had
predicted.
Not available Cumulative lapse
rate is 4% after the
30 day free look
period, compared
to 11% for the
general market.
472 policies remain
in force. One claim
is in process.
Payroll deductions
may discourage
lapsing because
people have to take
affirmative action
to stop deductions.
Not available.
Note: From “Federal and State Initiative to Jump Start the Market for Private Long-Term Care Insurance.” By J.
Weiner, J. Tilly, & S. Goldenson. 2000. Elder Law Journal, 8 (1). p. 57-102.
Employer sponsored long-term care
insurance provides greater access to
coverage than individual policies
(Thompson, 1992; Pincus, 2000b). For
example, Ohio’s State Teachers Retirement
System (STRS) offers less restrictive
underwriting and even guarantees issue
policies (i.e., do not require health
information) during initial offerings to
employees. In addition, STRS offers
coverage to at least one group in addition to
full-time active employees (i.e., parents/in-
laws, spouses, and retired employees),
potentially extending the benefit well
beyond the size of the employee population
in the state of Ohio.
There are potential limitations of
state-based private coverage, including: (1)
insufficient numbers of individuals having
any long-term care protection when they
need it because of low enrollment rates and
possibly high lapses, (2) insufficient
protection for those who do retain their
coverage until they need benefits because of
a failure to purchase inflation protection, (3)
a lack of value for individuals who pay
substantial premiums and then lapse, and (4)
limitations in policies’ ability to adapt to
changes in the long-term care delivery
system.
Only five states, (California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Washington, and
Wisconsin) have over three years experience
in offering long-term care insurance to their
employees (Wiener, et al., 2000) (See Table
4).
Ohio has three long-term care
insurance programs: the State of Ohio Plan,
STRS, and Public Employees Retirement
System (PERS). The state of Ohio Plan is
designed for active employees and their
spouses; retirees are not eligible for this
program. The plan has around 62,000
members. The STRS is designed for state
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teachers. The plan has around 400,000
members (350,00 active employees and
50,000 retirees and spouses. PERS has
around 100,000 members. Only retirees and
spouses are eligible for PERS.
PERS limits the number of benefit
choices. PERS offers two to four benefit
amount options and a set package rather
than allowing the employee to select every
option separately. Nearly all states use a
single LTC insurer. The state of Ohio Plan,
STRS, and PERS all use Aetna Life
Insurance Co. These practices simplify the
multiplicity of choices generally related to
purchasing long-term care insurance.
Despite the limited choices of
benefits, research suggests that the benefit
features of group plans in Ohio generally
resemble the most common individually
purchased policies nationally (Pincus,
2000a). As an illustration, the state of Ohio
plan, STRS, and PERS offer a full range of
coverage for most recognized long-term care
services, with most including a 60 or 90 day
elimination period (the deductible period
between qualification for benefits and the
first day benefits can be received).
The state of Ohio plan, STRS, and
PERS all offer inflation protection, with all
three offering it immediately at a higher
initial premium and half offering only the
option to upgrade benefit levels in the future
(future purchase option). Policies that
increase benefits for inflation automatically
may use simple or compound rates. Either
way, the daily benefit increases each year by
a fixed percentage, usually 5%, for the life
of the policy or for a certain period, usually
10 or 20 years.
The dollar amount of the increase
depends on whether the inflation adjustment
is simple or compound. If the inflation
increase is simple, the benefit increases by
the same dollar amount each year. If the
inflation increase is compounded, the dollar
amount of the benefit increase goes up each
year.
Inflation protection is considered one
of the most important additions to a long-
term care insurance policy. Inflation
protection increases the premium. As an
illustration, a nursing home that costs $162 a
day (in 2000) will cost $349 a day in 10
years, if inflation is 8% a year (the cost of
nursing home care in Ohio has been rising at
an annual rate of 8% for the past several
years)(“Long-term care planning,” 1997).
All three plans offer a “non-
forfeiture" benefit that would provide the
purchaser some level of benefits if he or she
lapses (i.e., if coverage is stopped because
the individual stops paying premiums). This
benefit allows a consumer to receive some
value for the money one has paid into the
policy. Without this type of benefit, one
would get nothing even if one paid
premiums for 10 or 20 years before
dropping the policy. A nonforfeiture benefit
can add roughly 10 to 100% to a policy’s
cost. How much it adds depends on such
things as the insured’s age at the time they
bought the policy, the type of nonforfeiture
benefit, and whether the policy has inflation
protection.
The state of Ohio plan, STRS, and
PERS also offer the "reduced paid up
benefit," which provides a reduced benefit
amount over the same benefit period as
defined in the policy. Reduced paid up
benefits are much less likely to offer real
protection against the costs associated with
needing long-term care than other more
expensive non-forfeiture provisions, most
notably "shortened benefit period."
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STRS offers a "return of premium at
death," benefit. This feature allows a portion
of the premiums paid to be returned to the
insured's estate upon his or her death. To get
a refund at death, you must have paid
premiums for a certain number of years.
This benefit is only available to members
and their spouses. It is not available to
retirees or to parents and parents-in-law.
This benefit is not available through the
State of Ohio and PERS. Ten other states
offer this benefit. In addition, all three plans
require the employee to pay the entire
premium. This is generally the most
expensive type of benefit.
There is very little research on the
employer sponsored long-term care
insurance products in Ohio (Marlowe,
1996). The recent emergence of employer-
based long-term care insurance and its small
portion of sales may account for the lack of
research (LifePlans, 2001). The Health
Insurance Association of America (HIAA)
periodically surveys the major long-term
care insurers and publishes information
about the number of employers offering
long-term care insurance and size of those
employers on a periodic basis (LifePlans,
2000). Unfortunately, these reports do not
provide any further description of what
employers are offering (McSweeney,
1995a).
While this section adds to the
understanding of long-term care insurance
coverage offered by the state of Ohio,
several issues need to be investigated to
more fully assess the value of long-term care
insurance for state employees (Pincus,
2000b). Future research could focus on
addressing the following questions:
 Should the tax treatment of long-
term care insurance be enhanced?
Encouraging additional tax provisions
for these products would reduce the cost
long-term care insurance for many
Ohioans and strengthen public
confidence in this relatively new private
insurance coverage. Research could look
at the possible effects of enhanced tax
provisions.
 How does Ohio compare with other
states in adopting and implementing the
NAIC model regulations for long-term
care insurance? Currently, the state and
NAIC do not keep comparative
information on states implementation of
the various long-term care insurance
model regulations (NAIC, 2001a).
 What is the effect of the OSHIIP
program? There has not been a program
evaluation done on the OSHIIP program.
As an illustration, one research area
would be determining what impact the
program has on consumer knowledge in
the state. This information is critical
because one of the findings of this report
is that better consumer education is
essential for helping Ohioans understand
long-term care insurance.
 What types of long-term care
insurance are employees buying and are
they retaining their coverage? While
this section describes the State of Ohio
offerings (state of Ohio plan, PERS, and
STRS), identifying actual policies that
employees and retirees purchased was
beyond the scope of the study. Assessing
Future Research
Issues
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lapse rates and the extent to which
employees who purchase a policy
protect their benefit from erosion caused
by inflation either through built-in
protection or choosing to purchase more
coverage in the future (i.e., exercising
the future purchase option) are key
issues. Research that has been done in
this area has, for the most part, been
proprietary and focused on improving
the marketing of employer LTC
insurance (Pincus, 2000a).
 What role does and should the State
of Ohio play in managing long-term care
insurance reserves and renegotiating
LTC insurance contracts? Findings from
this study suggest that the state of Ohio
currently plays a very limited role in
designing policies and that changes to
covered benefits and management of
reserves is controlled by Aetna (the
insurer). However, the research only
addressed this item in a limited fashion.
The creation of guidelines for the State
of Ohio about roles it can play in
managing reserves and updating benefits
for the three plans may be useful to the
State of Ohio.
 To what extent do State of Ohio
employees want long-term care
insurance and what features would they
most like to have included in a policy?
What difference does the underwriting
mechanism make in enrollment rates?
Research regarding the appeal of long-
term care insurance to state employees
and retirees is lacking. Research could
assist the State of Ohio in making design
decisions, especially if those decisions
are contrary to the interests of Aetna
(e.g., offering a self-funded policy).
 What are the characteristics of the
population purchasing long-term care
insurance in Ohio? What types of
employees and retirees are purchasing
the plans and how many employees have
enough assets to protect themselves with
long-term care insurance? Would more
people purchase long-term care
insurance if the state contributed to the
premiums?
The long-term care insurance market
in the state of Ohio continues to grow at a
steady pace. Its growth has been sustained
largely through the consistent sales in the
individual market. As the market continues
to evolve, long-term care coverage likely
will be more widely available through
mechanisms other than the individual
market. The state of Ohio is already seeing
this in the employer sponsored market and
recent efforts to reinvent long-term care
coverage in life insurance policies.
Additional proof of this trend is the
emergence of new funding mechanisms such
as tax-deferred plans, retirement vehicles,
and even reverse mortgages.
The state government can play an
important role in encouraging the growth of
long-term care insurance. This could be
achieved by enhancing the tax treatment of
long-term care insurance. Encouraging
additional tax provisions for these products
would reduce the cost long-term care
insurance for many Ohioans, while
increasing the appeal of these policies to
state employees and retirees, and
strengthening public confidence in this
relatively new private insurance coverage.
Conclusion
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Further, enhanced tax incentives for the
purchase of long-term care insurance would
demonstrate the state’s support for and
commitment to the long-term care industry
as a major means of helping Ohioans fund
their future long-term care needs. These
efforts might lead to an increase in the
portion of the state’s population using long-
term care insurance to protect themselves
against catastrophic long-term care
expenses.
Tax incentives largely benefit two
groups. They could help those who did not
have the opportunity to purchase long-term
care coverage when they were younger and
the premiums were lower and who now face
the greatest affordability problems because
of their age. It could also help those younger
adults: Ohio’s baby boomers that need
incentives or mechanisms in order to fit
providing for their own long-term care
protection into their current multiple
priorities (for instance, mortgage payments,
children’s college tuition, and their own
financial and retirement planning).
Regulatory activity is key to quality
long-term care insurance.
Regulatory activity is key to quality
long-term care insurance. In particular,
current state efforts to develop standards on
premium rate stability, standardization of
policies, and mandating additional benefits
could enhance the marketplace. If enacted,
these proposed regulations could very well
enhance growth in the market.
Better consumer education is
essential.
Better consumer education is
essential. People often believe they already
have long-term care insurance or that they
will never need it. Education should begin
early, so that working age Ohioans
understand their risks for long-term care and
can plan for their potential while they have
the income to do so.
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Partnership for Long-Term Care
Beginning in 1988, The Robert Wood Johnson Foundation (RWJF) began funding the
Partnership for Long-Term Care, a public/private alliance between state governments and
insurance companies to create long-term care insurance programs. With a goal of solving a
portion of the long-term care financing problem, the RWJF awarded grants to four states--
California, Connecticut, Indiana, and New York--to work with private insurers to create
insurance policies that were more affordable and provided better protection against
impoverishment than those generally available. The resulting Partnership For Long-Term Care
combines private long-term care insurance with special Medicaid eligibility standards. It was
hoped that the program would stimulate market development of long-term care insurance
policies in three key areas: quality, affordability, and coordination. The Partnerships provide an
incentive for insurers to offer high quality products and for consumers to protect themselves
from the high cost of long-term care.
Over the course of the development phase of the program two program models emerged.
California, Connecticut and Indiana are using the Dollar for Dollar Model, while New York is
using the Total Assets approach. Insurers participating in a partnership must meet a special set of
criteria before selling these special long-term care insurance policies. To date, there are more
than 20 insurers participating in the Partnership Programs in the four states. Two insurers, GE
Capital and CNA, are filed in all four states.
Following the implementation of the Connecticut Partnership program in 1992, a number
of states initiated efforts to replicate the partnership program. However, due to the impact of the
passage of the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1993 (OBRA '93), most of the states simply
ceased their efforts at implementation.
Mark Meiners, Ph.D., Director of the Partnership for Long-Term Care, notes that "we
still have work to do to educate the public that long-term care is not somebody else's problem,
but a reality that is likely to cost in the hundreds of thousands of dollars for many American
families. It simply makes sense for people to purchase protection in the healthy years before
long-term care devours a family's accumulated savings and forces them into destitution. It can
provide peace of mind if and when the need arises."
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Partnership for Long-Term Care
Program Highlights
State Highlights
The PERS success in California continues to be dramatic, with over 40,000 applications
received during the most recent offering. If past experience holds true, about 2,000 of these
applications should be for Partnership policies. Broadly supported legislation is currently being
considered that would require the inclusion of many of the consumer-friendly provisions
championed by the California Partnership Program in all LTC insurance products issued in
California. Many of these provisions have already been voluntarily adopted by insurers, both
those participating and non-participating in the Partnership. At the same time that these
improvements are being made in all LTC products, the California Partnership Program is being
redesigned to keep current with trends in the LTC industry and reduce possible continuity of care
issues related to movement from Partnership private coverage to Medi-Cal.
During the first six months of 1997, the Connecticut Partnership Program has
experienced considerable growth with policy sales more than doubling over the previous six-
month period. First-time purchasers represent 90% of the sales. Of the 3,229 policies in force,
the average policyholder's age is 61 years. Connecticut also recently began offering a partnership
long-term care insurance policy to state employees. Information on the Connecticut Partnership
can now be obtained from its web site at http://www.opm.state.ct.us/pdp4/ltc/home.htm.
The Indiana Partnership Program, which has been marketing its program since 1993, has
hit several milestones. Of the more than 2,500 policies sold, more than 2,100 are in force.
Although the average age of policyholders remains 68 years, Indiana saw a 13.5% increase from
the last quarter in the number of purchasers aged 60 years or less. Currently, marketing tools
have been put in place to assist the partnership insurance agents in Indiana.
The New York Partnership Program is using the Total Assets Model, which requires
insurers to meet a somewhat different set of criteria before they are certified to issue policies by
the state insurance department. New York's Governor Pataki signed into law Chapter 42 of the
Laws of 1997 which provides a first dollar state tax deduction for LTC insurance premiums in
accordance with the limitations set forth in HIPAA. The Partnership Program is now under the
administration of the New York State Department of Health, Office of Medicaid Management.
Information about the Partnership can be accessed on the Internet at: www.nyspltc.org.
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Uniform Data Set Undergoes Major Revisions
Since 1993, partnership states required insurers to report program activity on a regular
basis. The four participating states developed a Uniform Data Set to ease the reporting burden on
insurers participating in more than one state.
Recently, the participating states proposed major revisions to the data set. Several files
have been dropped and others have been consolidated or streamlined. These changes should
make it easier for insurers to report program activity and for states to track partnership progress.
If approved by participating insurers, the changes will take effect over the next six months.
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA)
The passage of HIPAA brought a number of changes to partnership programs. In general,
the tax advantages granted to individuals and employers who have or will purchase long-term
care insurance policies should significantly stimulate the market.
Partnership staff in each state have worked hard both to comment on the overall
regulations and to alter their individual programs to recognize the new requirements imposed by
HIPAA and enacted by state insurance divisions. This activity is nearly complete in some states
and ongoing in others.
Summary of Partnership Policy Sales
Policy sales to date indicate steadily growing interest in public/private long-term care
insurance policies. Sales also indicate that, when given the opportunity, consumers are willing to
protect themselves against the costs of long-term care. The following are highlights from
Partnership policy sales in the four funded states.
 Of the more than 26,000 applications received for the purchase of partnership long-term care
insurance policies in the four participating states, there are currently more than 21,000
policies in force.
 Three states allow the sale of one- and two-year partnership policies. The percentage of
policyholders purchasing these policies remains high: California at 93%, Connecticut at
33%, and Indiana at 35%.
 The majority of partnership policy purchasers are first-time buyers. They range from a high
of 96% in California to a low of 82% in Indiana.
 The percentage of policyholders under the age of 65 continues to grow. For example, in
Connecticut, the average age of the group policyholder is 53 years old, while the average
age for the individual policyholder is 63 years old.
 The vast majority are married (almost 70%) and female (60%).
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For more information on the Partnership for Long-Term Care program contact:
National Program Office
Mark R. Meiners, Ph.D., Director
University of Maryland Center of Aging
1240 HHP Building
College Park, MD 20742-2611
Phone: 301-405-7555
or you may visit their web page at: http://www.inform.umd.edu/aging/PLTC/index.html
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State Statutes for Tax Incentives Concerning Long-Term Care Insurance
Alabama (Deduction)
Allows a state income tax deduction for premiums paid for a qualifying long-term care
policy. Policies must be guaranteed renewable and coverage must be equal to or greater than
three years of Medicaid coverage.
California (Deduction)
The deduction applies only to tax-qualified LTC policies for taxable years beginning in
1997. The maximum deductible amount is based on a sliding scale which is increased each year
to account for inflation. Also, beginning with this tax year California residents who need long-
term care services for at least 180 days can qualify for a $500 tax credit. This is not available if
adjusted gross income exceeds $100,000.
Colorado (Credit)
For tax years beginning on or after January 1, 2000, H.B. 1246 allows a nonrefundable
state income tax credit. The amount of the credit is 25% of the cost of the policy, up to a
maximum of $150 for each policy. The credit is available to individual filers with federal taxable
income of less than $50,000; joint filers with federal taxable income of less than $50,000 if the
credit is claimed for one policy; or joint filers with federal taxable income of less than $100,000
if the credit is claimed for two policies.
Hawaii (Credit/Deduction)
If adopted, proposed legislation in Hawaii would allow individual taxpayers to take either
a credit or a deduction for expenses relating to long-term care insurance. Among the most recent
pieces of legislation, S.B. 3144 would allow individual taxpayers meeting a threshold adjusted
gross income level to take a personal income tax credit equaling a percentage of the costs paid
for long-term care insurance premiums, whereas H.B. 170 would allow a deduction
commensurate with that provided under federal law.
Indiana (Deduction)
Beginning January 1, 2000, a deduction is allowed in an amount equal to the portion of
any premiums paid during the taxable year by the taxpayer for a qualified long-term care policy
for the taxpayer or the taxpayer's spouse, or both.
Iowa (Deduction)
Long-term care insurance premiums for nursing home coverage are eligible for a
deduction to the extent premiums are eligible for the federal itemized deduction for medical and
dental expenses.
Kentucky (Deduction)
One hundred percent of premiums paid for LTC policies can be deducted from the state
income tax.
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Maine (Deduction/Credit)
Individuals can deduct premiums from their state income tax for policies that cover both
nursing home and home care services and that are certified by the state insurance department.
Maryland (Credit)
S.B. 171 allows individuals to offset their state tax liability by a one-time credit equaling
up to one hundred percent of eligible long-term care insurance premiums. The credit may not
exceed $500 for each insured for which premiums are paid for those over age 50. For those aged
41-50 the credit is $410. For those under 41, the credit is $220. Those individuals covered by
Long-Term Care Insurance at any time before July 1, 2000 are not eligible to claim the credit.
Minnesota (Credit)
A tax deduction is allowed for long-term care policies with lifetime maximum benefits of
$100,000 or more with benefits that adjust for inflation. It is in the form of a tax credit that is the
lower of $100 or 25 percent of premiums paid, to the extent they are not deducted in determining
federal taxable income. Minnesota is considering an increase in its tax credit.
Missouri (Deduction)
Beginning after January 1, 2000, a Missouri resident may deduct 50% of his or her
unreimbursed payments for qualified long-term care insurance premiums to the extent such
amounts are not already included in itemized deductions claimed by the individual.
Montana (Deduction)
All premium payments for policies covering both facility care and home care may be
deducted retroactively to the 1995 tax year. Premium payments made by a person for parents or
grandparents can also be deducted starting in the 1997 tax year. In addition, for taxable years
beginning after 1998, a state income tax credit is allowed for "qualified elderly care expenses"
paid by an individual for the care of a "qualified family member" during the taxable year.
Premiums paid for long-term care insurance coverage for a qualifying family member are
included in "qualified elderly care expenses." The amount of the elderly care expense credit that
may be claimed by the taxpayer depends on his or her adjusted gross income. Taxpayers
claiming this credit are prohibited from taking an additional income tax deduction for premium
payments on the same policy for which the credit is taken.
New York (Deduction)
A tax deduction is allowed beginning in 1996 for policies that meet minimum loss ratio
standards and are federally tax qualified.
North Carolina (Credit)
A nonrefundable state income tax credit equal to 15% of premiums paid is allowed for
tax qualified long-term care policies, up to a maximum of $350 per policy. This credit expires for
taxable years beginning on or after January 1, 2004.
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North Dakota (Credit)
A state income tax deduction is allowed for 25% of the amount paid for long-term care
policies for a taxpayer, taxpayer's spouse, parent, stepparent or child. The deduction may not
exceed $100 for each insured individual.
Ohio (Deduction)
For taxable years beginning on or after January 1, 1999, a deduction is allowed for
amounts paid by a taxpayer for qualified long-term care insurance for the taxpayer and the
taxpayer's spouse and dependents.
Oregon (Credit)
Taxpayers may claim a nonrefundable credit for long-term care insurance premiums for
policies on behalf of the taxpayer, the taxpayer's dependents or parents. The credit is available in
tax years beginning after December 31, 1999, for policies for first issued after December 31,
1999. The amount of the credit is equal to the lesser of 15% of the total amount of long-term care
insurance premiums paid or incurred by the taxpayer during the tax year or $500 for the taxpayer
and the dependents or parents of the taxpayer.
Utah (Deduction)
After January 1, 2000, individuals may deduct long-term care insurance premiums for
their state personal incomes taxes for the purpose of determining Utah taxable income. This
deduction is limited to the extent that these expenses were deducted for federal tax purposes.
Virginia (Deduction)
Provided the individual has not claimed a deduction for federal tax purposes, long-term
care insurance premiums may be deducted from federal adjusted gross income in calculating
Virginia taxable income. This deduction is effective for taxable years beginning on or after
January 1, 2000.
West Virginia (Deduction)
For tax years beginning after December 31, 1999, premiums for qualified long-term care
insurance policies are fully deductible for West Virginia income tax purposes to the extent that
they are not allowable as a deduction in arriving at the taxpayer's federal adjusted gross income.
Wisconsin (Deduction)
All premiums paid by individuals and their spouses can be deducted from gross income
when figuring the amount that qualifies as federal adjusted gross income for state income taxes.
